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A response to James Hathaways 'Fixing the refugee system
The geography of a global
relu^ee system
^
Joris Schap^ndonk sees several strengths of Hathaway's global refugee
system. But geographical differences, individual and collective aspirations
of refugees and an emerging migration industry desen/e more attention.
Concrete ways will have to be sought to incorporate the socio-economic
lifeworlds of refugees.
unng tiie conterence 'A human act or devil's pact?
Human rights aspects of migration agreements
between EU and third countries', organized by the
College voor de Rechten van de Mens and the Commissie
Meijers (The Hague, 18 May 2017), the Canadian Professor
James Hathaway presented his straightforward five-point plan
that aims to 'fix the international refugee system.' Professor
Hathaway - an internationally acknowledged authority in
the field of refugee law - is firm and clear in his critique of
the current global refugee system. According to him, it is just
highly dysfunctional.
Before I recapture his diagnosis of the current state of affairs
and his proposal to fix the system, it is important o note that
the so-called European refugee crisis has not been the main
reason for him to fundamentally rethink the current refugee
system. In fact, during his ESIL lecture in Amsterdam one
year previously, he stressed that the developed world could
now finally see and experience the horror that has routinely
afflicted states of the Global South for decades.3 This reality
gives rise to his hope that the Global North now also starts to
realize that the system needs some fundamental fixing.
In this commentary, I briefly outline and comment on his main
ideas from my own academic point of view. That is to say that
I am not a legal scholar, nor an expert on refugees per se, and
for this reason I cannot provide any critique on the legal tech-
nicalities of Hathaway's global refugee system. In fact, I will
use my specific disciplinary background of Human Geography
1 j.schapendonk@fm.rn.nl
2 This paper is an elaborated version of my presentation at the conference 'A
human act or devil's pact? Human rights aspects of migration agreements
between EU and third countries', organized by the College voor de Rechten van
de Mens and the Commissie Meijers fThe Hague, 18 May 2017).
3 J. Hathaway, 'Fixing the refugee system', ESIL Lecture Series, 13 May 2016,
Amsterdam, http://bit.ly/2CgdChH; accessed 16 May 2017.
as well as my research on the migration trajectories of African
migrants towards Europe4 to reflect on his main ideas.
1. The problem and the fixing
It is crucial to note that Hathaway's diagnosis of the problem
does not address the Refugee Convention itself. For Hathaway,
the legal definition of a refugee has proven to be extremely
flexible so that it includes initially unforeseen groups of
people in need of protection. At the same time, the convention
is massively attentive to the safety and security concerns of
states by,5 for instance, excluding fugitives from a legal refugee
status. For Hathaway, the problem of'the current situation is
not a problem of rules and regulations, it is actually a problem
of implementation: The refugee regime was never intended
to operate in the atomized and uncoordinated way that has
characterized most of its nearly 65-years of history.'6
One of his main concerns is that he refugee regime has placed
the challenge of receiving refugees (and its financial burdens)
on the shoulders of states located in the Global South. More
than 80 per cent of the refugees are found in the developing
world. These countries with very little resources receive very
little financial support of the developed world to cope with
the refugee situations at play. By looking at the numbers,
Hathaway finds the efforts of the richer countries to resettle
refugees from the Global South simply a joke.7 He concludes
This project, entitled 'Fortress Europe as a mobile space? The intra-EU mobility
of African migrants', is funded by a VENI grant from the Netherlands Organisation
of Scientific Research (NWO- reference number: 451-14-011).
J. Hathaway, 'A global solution to a global crisis', European Papers 2016, 1(1), p.
96.
J. Hathaway, 'A global solution to a global crisis', European Papers 2016, 1 (1 ), p.
96.
As he stated during his ESIL lecture: 'Not only do we [the developed world] do
almost nothing to guarantee payment for this system, but in human terms our
contributions are beyond pathetic. Of the 25 million or so refugees in the world,
only about a 100,000 were resettled last year. And in that, really only three
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that the global refugee system lacks international solidarity
which, as a direct consequence, leaves many refugee communi-
ties to live in isolated but permanent refagee camps, sometimes
for generations. As he underlines, the majority of refugees in
the world has never been able 'to get back on their feet again'
after they have left their countries of origin.8
The current system of ad hoc responses of single states also
produces, according to this scholar of refugee law, avoidable
humanitarian dramas due to the lack of binding instituti-
onal mechanisms that prepare for refugee movements. As we
have seen in Greece and the rest of Europe in 2015, the lack
of political organization has left many tens of thousands of
refugees in desperate conditions and has produced severe limbo
situations in which refugees endlessly wait in UNCHR camps at
best, or in self-improvised shelters at worst. In other words, it is
a dysfunctional system because it has never achieved to create
order in a context of disordered refagee situations, neither for
refugees - nor for states.
As an alternative, James Hathaway pleads for a global system
that shares out the financial burdens and humanitarian respon-
sibilities for any refugee movement. His proposal is based on
an administrative infrastructure that creates a more orderly
and dignified protection process, which would be in the end
beneficial for states in the Global South, states in the Global
North and, not the least important, the refugees in question.
In a nutshell, Hathaway's solution to the messy refugee situ-
ations all over the world is a global distribution system that
decouples the actual location of the refugee from the location
of protection.
The main argument for this is that in the current situation
refugees are granted limited access to 'meaningful protection'
due to the political reluctance of states to deal property with
refugees.9 This reluctance is based on a general belief among
governments that refugees impose 'unconditional and inde-
finite obligations on them'.10 As Hathaway firmly states, this
results in regressive political means, such as the building of
fences and walls, to 'solve' unpredictable refugee movements."
With the decoupling of the actual ocation of a refugee from
the location of protection he puts emphasis on the very first
priority of refugees: to get oneself in a safe place. In exchange
for this, he somehow sacrifices the free will and preferences
of people where this safe place actually should be. As he
summarized during his lecture: dignity comes first, people's
choices come second. With this point, he emphasizes that the
refugee system is not an immigration system but a human
rights system 'that provides protection for the duration of
risk'.12 Consequently, people who enter his global refugee
system might be transferred to locations very far away from
the locations where they found access to the refugee system.
Indeed, he imagines a refugee distribution system on a global
level that is based on burden and responsibility sharing
between states. It is a common but differentiated system,
countries - and none of them in the European Union - did the oven/vhelming
share of the work' (J. Hathaway, 'Fixing the refugee system', ESIL Lecture Series,
13 May 2016, Amsterdam, http://bit.ly/2CgdChH; accessed 16 May 2017.
8 J. Hathaway, 'A global solution to a global crisis', European Papers 2016, 1(1), p.
94.
9 J. Hathaway, 'A global solution to a global crisis', European Papers 2016, 1 (1), p.
96 emphasis added.
10 J. Hathaway, 'A global solution to a global crisis', European Papers 2016, 1 (1), p.
96.
11 J. Hathaway, 'Fixing the refugee system', ESIL Lecture Series, 13 May 2016,
Amsterdam, http://bit.ly/2CgdChH; accessed 16 May 2017.
12 J. Hathaway, 'Fixing the refugee system', ES/L Lecture Series, 13 May 201 6,
Amsterdam, http://bit.ly/2CgdChH; accessed 16 May 2017.
meaning that all states contribute though not in the same way.
It is a system that moves from national administration tointer-
national quotas and status determination. In so doing, this
system prepares for, rather than reacts to, refugee movements
and guarantees access to meaningful protection for all refugees
with no penalty for unlawful entry or presence.
2. A geographical critique
2.1 Three strengths
Let me start with highlighting why I think we should embrace
this proposal - or at least think with it - instead of accepting
the status quo. Professor Hathaway proposes a system that is
based on the principle that any refugee crisis is a global crisis,
and this demands burden-sharing and international coopera-
tion." Therefore, the first major strength of his proposal is that
it challenges us to go beyond the Eurocentric discourse that has
somehow defined the Syrian crisis as a European refugee crisis.
The system Hathaway proposes asks us to broaden our perspec-
tive by taking into account the realities for refugees in faraway
places, such as the Somali refugee communities in Kenya,14
the Syrian refugees in Lebanon15 and the Rohingya refugees in
Bangladesh or Indonesia.16 Changing this Eurocentric perspec-
tive also means that we do not see Turkey, Libya or Morocco
simply as 'transit states' in the framework of migration policy
making," nor do we approach Nigeria and Ethiopia simply as
'countries of origin'. These countries too have their complex
immigration and emigration flows, and these states too have
their own political concerns and policy priorities as regards
migration.18 Moving towards the global perspective that
Professor Hathaway suggests is not an easy shift, but it is
necessary to put the EU situation in the right perspective, both
in terms of the numbers of incoming refugees and in terms of
the notion that 'Europe is not the one and only political actor
who is responsible for solving the problem.'19
The second major strength of Hathaway's proposal is that it
concerns a system that prepares for refugee movements rather
than being a system that reacts once 'we' think that there are
too many refugees moving in our direction. By getting rid of
the criminalization of refugees for crossing borders in unau-
thorized means, it will put an end to what is called the deter-
rence paradigm in which states react to refugee movements
with restrictive migration control policies.20 This would be a
major step forwards.
13 See also J. Schapendonk, 'Toekomstig migratiebeleid. Een stuurloos schip?',
Geogratie, November/December 2015, pp. 6-9.
14 For example C. Horst, Transnational nomads, how Somalis cope with refugee life
sn the Dadaab camps of Kenya, New York, Berghahn Books, 2006.
15 For example M. de Looijer, 'Libanese onderhandelingen om gastvrijheid', AGOHA
2016, 32(1), pp. 22-25.
16 For example A. Fajri, 'Solidarity with neighbors. The case of Rohingya refugees
in Aceh-lndonesia', presentation at the 2nd Transmobilities Conference, 8 June
2017, Ravenstein.
17 See also M. Collyer, F. Duvell and H. de Haas, 'Critical approaches to transit
migration', Population, Space and Place 2012, 18(4), pp. 407-414.
18 See for example A. Adepoju, T. van Naerssen and A. Zoomers (Eds. ), International
migration and national development in sub-Saharan Africa. Viewpoints and policy
initiatives in the countries of origin, Leiden, Brill, 2008.
19 See also M. Ignatieff, 'The refugee crisis isn't a 'European crisis', The New
York Times, 5 September 2015. http://nyti.ms/2HaGPy9; accessed 5 February
2018.
20 T. Gammeltoft-Hansen and N. Tan, 'The end of the deterrence paradigm? Future
directions for global refugee policy', Journal on Migration and Human Security
2017, 5(1), pp. 28-56.
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Thirdly, this proposal clearly takes into account the refugees'
livelihoods after they have found institutional protection. It
centres around the idea that refagees deserve to have a future,
somewhere. During his presentation on the 18th of May 2017,
Professor Hathaway underlined that many discussions on the
Refugee Convention overlook what he calls the 'core of the
Refugee Convention'. The core of the convention is about empo-
wering refugees to get back on their feet again, to live indepen-
dent lives.
Furthermore, and unsurprisingly so, reception conditions
differ significantly. There are reception centres that grant you
more freedom than others, that give you more pocket
than others, that give you better legal assistance than others.
Needless to indicate, the chances to 'move on in life' are of
course also dependent on local conditions. That is the reason
why many migrants - even if they have been granted a protec-
tion status - move unseen and sometimes undocumented to
places outside Italy. A global refugee system on paper does
The proposal for a global solution challenges us to go beyond the Eurocentric discourse
that has somehow defined the Syrian crisis as a European refugee crisis
2.2 Three concerns
Despite this positive foundation, I do have three interrelated
concerns that I would like to raise here. The first refers to
the idea that somehow 'the global' dimension of Hathaway's
proposal seems to translate almost automatically into a homo-
geneous and universal system. Whether a refugee deserves
protection is not the main concern of geographers, because
that is the field of legal scholars. For us geographers, it is more
interesting to raise the questions where this protection can be
granted, and why there? In this sense, a global solution is never
really global as there are always local dynamics that create
differentiation and deviation.
To give a metaphorical example: a bottle of Fanta lemonade
looks and tastes very differently in Dar el Salaam than it does
in The Hague. Local twists give Fanta different characteristics
across the globe. In this context, Hathaway provides very little
clarity with regard to the fundamental geographical questions
involved. After all, the question in the head of many refugees is:
where is my new home? The answer that Hathaway's proposed
system would provide is basically the following: your new
home can be anywhere, because it is not you who decides where
you go but the system.
At this point, there is an interesting parallel with my empirical
work within and beyond Europe. For many of my West African
respondents who have survived the desert journey through
Libya and who have reached Italy later on, the Italian asylum
system is what hey call "a paper lottery'.21 It is a paper lottery
because you have no decision-making power at all where your
case will be processed. And, in terms of the outcome and length
of the procedures, this seems to matter. I am following six
young men from Senegambia since the beginning of 2014, and
they have similar narratives and socio-political backgrounds.
They more or less followed the same route and even reached
Lampedusa with the same boat. But from there they were
transferred to different places, and the legal outcomes of their
asylum cases differ considerably, from obtaining a five-year
protection-based status to being undocumented ever since.
Thus, while Hathaway's ystem seeks for global solutions,
there are questions to be raised regarding the universality and
standardization f asylum within the same country. Evidently,
more discrepancies arise when we scale up the question of the
harmonization of asylum to the level of the European Union.22
21 J. Schapendonk, 'Navigating the migration industry. Migrants moving through
an African-European web of facilitation/control', Journal of Ethnic and Migration
Sfud/'es 2017, http://bit.ly/2G8cNK9; accessed on 5 February 2018; see also
M. Belfoni, 'Refugees as gamblers. Eritreans eeking to migrate through Italy',
Journal of Immigrants, Refugee Studies 201 G, 14(1), pp. 104-119.
22 See also R. Bruin, S.G. Kok and A. Teriouw, Dublin: 'Blind interstatelijk vertrouwen
is een fictie', Justitiele Verkenningen, 41 (3), pp. 71-89.
not wipe out geographical differences, and it is important to
realize this in order to prevent he spread of false promises and
high hopes.
My second concern is strongly related to the former. Hathaway's
proposal is rather unclear about the foreseen directionality
of the relocations that the system would produce in practice.
One can interpret this in two ways. Considering Hathaway's
critique of the absence of structural resettlements in the
current system, the proposal can be basically approached as a
redistribution model bringing more refugees from the Global
South to the Global North. When this directionality ismade
explicit, I am less convinced than Professor Hathaway whether
there is sufficient political will in the Global North to accept
and embrace this new system.
Alternatively, the proposed system can indeed be a global
lottery where matching may exist, but in theory refugees
can be relocated within the Global South, within the Global
North, from the South to the North, and maybe also from the
North to the South, from, let us say, Sweden to Angola.23 This
lottery system would undoubtedly create new challenges as it
pinpoints refugees to places that do not necessarily meet their
aspirations.
I would like to relate this point to Hathaway's own critique
regarding EU's Dublin Convention.24 For Hathaway there is no
legal reason in the Refugee Convention to assign refugee's first
country of entry as his/her destination country. This regulation
would actually create an incentive for refugees to move onwards
in irregular ways. The lottery principle of the global system that
is proposed may produce unintended and undesirable conse-
quences for the same reason. We know from studies like that
of Cindy Horst (2006) in the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya or
that of Judith Zijlstra and Ilse van Liempt (2017) on the Balkan
route that refugees are 'connected' people.25 Through their
social networks, they compare their situations, discuss oppor-
tunities and navigate their journeys.26 If you deprive refugees
completely of choice, as the system does so clearly, I am afraid
that we will have a flourishing industry specialized in 'rein-
troducing' agency and choice for the very same refugees. This
23 J. Hathaway, 'Fixing the refugee system', ESIL Lecture Series, 13 May 2016,
Amsterdam, http://bit.ly/2CgdChH; accessed 16 May 2017.
24 J. Hathaway, 'Fixing the refugee system', ESIL Lecture Series, 13 May 2016,
Amsterdam, http://bit.ly/2CgdChH; accessed 16 May 2017.
25 C. Horst, Transnational nomads. How Somalis cope with refugee life in the Dadaab
camps of Kenya, New York, Berghahn Books, 2006; J. Zijlstra, I. van Liempt,
'Smart (phone) travelling. Understanding the use and impact of mobile technology
on irregular migration journeys', International Journal of Migration and Border
Stud/es 2017, 3(2-3), pp. 174-191.
26 See also M. Belloni, 'Refugees as gamblers. Eritreans seeking to migrate through
\ta\y'. Journal of Immigrants Refugee Studies 2016, 14(1), pp. 104-119.
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industry consists of the many brokering services,27 smugglers,28
traffickers and other actors that are specialized in arranging
the paperwork,29 providing legal gymnastics and/or facilitating
the journeys of would-be movers.30
aspirations than seeking protection, like finding a good job,
raising a family, et cetera. These aspirations are quite human -
as Hathaway would say. But one could also have a very different
reading of his proposal. Namely, that his plea for more social
rou deprive refugees completely of choice, we will have a flourishing industry
specialized in 'reintroducing' agency, consisting of the brokering services, smugglers and
traffickers.
In my viewpoint, refugees are indeed forced to leave home, but
that does not mean that they have no idea about where they
can build up their new homes. Many prefer to stay close to the
country of origin, others try their luck further away. In order to
avoid new forms of disordered migration, I think we should
take the aspirations of refugees eriously into account in the
relocation process. The principle of matching, which is repea-
tedly mentioned by Hathaway, could be an important first step
towards this. However, the fact that it is not explicitly incorpo-
rated in his five-point plan makes me wonder about the
strategic role matching plays in the system and the way it will
be actually operationalized when it comes down to individual
and collective aspirations.
My third concern points to a tension in the main line of argu-
mentation with regard to refugees' right to live independent
lives, as advocated by Hathaway. Following his arguments,
refugees are sharply distinguished from economic migrants
as the former find themselves in a human rights system and
the latter in an immigration system. In some of his lectures,
Hathaway semi-joldngly stated that students would fail his
courses if they write about 'economic refugees'. To some
extent, I accept this argument and I agree with him that it
should not matter, in legal terms, whether a refugee has other
27 J. Alpes, Bushfalling. How young Camgroonians dare to migrate, Amsterdam,
University of Amsterdam, 2011 .
28 I.van Liempt, 'Different geographies and experiences of "assisted" types of
migration. A gendered critique on the distinction between trafficking and
smuggling', Gender, Place and Culture 2011, 18(02), pp. 179-1 93.
29 M. van Reisen, M. Estefanos and C. Rijken, Human trafficking in the Sinai.
Refugees between life and death, Oisterwijk, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2012.
30 For a broader discussion of the so-called migration industry, see S. Cranston, J.
Schapendonk and E. Spaan, 'New directions in exploring the migration industries.
Introduction to special issue', Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 201 7,
online preview: http://bit.ly/2BqEaJG; accessed on 5 February 2018.
and economic rights to enable refugees to 'go on with their
lives' actually challenges governments to acknowledge that
every refugee is in potential an immigrant and that every
refugee deserves to live in an environment in which she or he
can build a new home. This message might be more controver-
sial in the political sense, but at least it is more transparent
and honest about what it entails for states when refugees are
granted w^th social and economic rights.
In other words, the five-point plan seeks to spread two main
messages that I found very hard to reconcile. On the one hand,
the main message to national governments is: do not worry,
these refugees are here for a specific duration of risk. On the
other hand, the main message to refugees is: please do your
best and invest in your futures and create your new homes,
wherever the system decides it to be. Because of this tension,
I foresee a highly problematic situation in which refugees
who have managed to get back on their feet again are actively
pushed by governments (after the duration of risk has passed)
to leave their new homes behind again because it is assumed/
preferred that heir eal homes are located somewhere lse - in
their country of origin.31
Again, I would like to express my appreciation to Professor
Hathaway and the team of experts he has worked with for deve-
loping this global refugee system. However, before we continue
to work with it, I think it is wise to anticipate better some of the
foreseen consequences, to remain realistic about the geograp-
hical differences within a global system and to seek concrete
ways to incorporate the socio-economic lifeworlds of refugees.
31 For an elaborative argument, see L. Malkki, 'National geographic. The rooting
of peoples and the temtorialization of national identity among scholars and
refugees', Cultural anthropology 1992, 7(1), pp. 24-44.
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A brief response
James C. Hathaway*
James Hathaway understands the risks of his proposal,
but because the present system delivers tragically little
it would be wrong not to aim for a fundamental and
global reform.
Dr. Schapendonk's engagement with my proposal to reform
the way we implement global refugee law - his willingness 'to
think with' my five-point plan - is a wonderful gift. As the plan
was explicitly offered as a conversation opener rather than
as a 'ready to roll out' model, his insights from the optic of
migration dynamics are both welcome and important.
His first concern is that even with the shift I propose from
state-by-state to common international dministration there
would still likely to be variations in the way that refugees are
treated in different regions of the world. I suspect he is correct
that it will be difficult to attain a completely 'homogeneous
and universal' system. But given the truly massive dispari-
ties in the way refagees are treated today from one country to
another, I'd say that the shift to international dministration
is still worth contemplating. After all, some progress toward
seeing all refugees as equally worthy of dignified treatment
is surely better than none. The efficiencies of the shift would
also yield many millions of euros that could be used to fund
other critical aspects of the proposed protection regime,
such as providing start-up grants for refugees to collaborate
with host communities in developing shared economies. A
common status assessment system would moreover provide
the basis for global responsibility sharing, since there would
be a single mechanism for assessing entitlement o protection.
And once refugees are allocated for protection, I believe that
we can at least attenuate differences of treatment by means
of the real incentives built into the proposed system for host
states to meet international protection standards: specifically,
verifiable respect for refugee rights would be the quid pro quo
for receiving both guarantees of burden sharing and offers of
residual resettlement places for refugees unable either to go
home or to integrate locally.
But will some refugees resist a managed process of assignment
to a state - usually in their region of origin in order to maximize
cultural and functional compatibility - for the maximum
6-year 'duration of risk' phase? And might some refugees not
be keen to accept a residual offer of permanent resettlement
to a state - normally in another egion, and predominantly
in the developed world - if unable to go home or to integrate
locally? I find this concern especially troubling; as a human
rights lawyer I'm loathe to impose a solution on anyone. But
again it's important to think about the ground reality: most
refugees today have no meaningful choice about where to go,
and are often stuck for decades in protracted refugee situations
in countries that are unable really to protect them. We should
of course attenuate the element of compulsion by building on
new insights about 'preference matching' - giving individual
refugees some voice in the assignment process. But in the end,
isn't it more important to give every refugee a dignified alter-
native to being persecuted at home than it is to guarantee all
refugees perfect choice about where to go?
And yes, I agree with Dr. Schapendonk that some refugees
will find ways - no doubt abetted by smugglers - to evade the
managed regime. But that would be no more true than it is
under extant completely arbitrary assignment regimes, such as
that established by the Dublin Regulation. At least under the
proposed approach, more refugees would have more dignified
options than they do now.
The third concern is that it may be difficult to reconcile
a commitment to empowering refugees - in particular by
ensuring that they can work and start businesses - with the
"model's two-phase protection process comprising up to 6 years
in a regional host state followed by extraregional permanent
resettlement if necessary. It's of course true that the best result
would be to give all
refugees an immediate and permanent new home. But the
commitment to guaranteeing all refugees unable to go home
permanent resettlement depends on keeping the numbers
manageable. Since about 1/3 of refugees can and do safely repa-
triate within 6 years and recent research suggests that almost
as many may be offered local integration under an empowe-
ring approach to 'protection for duration of risk,' the 6-year
buffer is an important means of ensuring that the number of
refugees needing resettlement is kept in check - and hence
the residual resettlement guarantee can be honoured. More
generally, though, research on refugee economies suggests
that even refugees not granted a permanent status can and do
become economically productive quite quickly, often able not
only to meet heir own needs but even to produce employment
opportunities for host populations. This makes them more
viable candidates for local integration or, if they either repa-
triate or resettle, can provide them with a new and valuable set
of skills and connections.
In the end, I agree with Dr. Schapendonk that it is best to
identify and to begin thinking about responses to the concerns
that he and others have raised. The key imperative, though,
is to reorient that conversation away from the piecemeal
tinkering now on offer under the UN'S global compact process.
For the first time, powerful states are experiencing some of
the dysfiinctionality ofthe way refugee law is implemented,
thus giving us a perhaps unique opportunity to enlist them
in the global reform process. It would literally be a tragedy to
squander that opportunity, as the UN now seems poised to do.
Yes, there are clearly risks in changing the way to protection.
But since we know that he present system delivers tragically
little both to most refugees and to the overwhelmingly impove-
rished states that host them, it would be wrong not to aim for
a truly fundamental and global reform. My sincere hope is
that others will join Joris Schapendornk and me in 'thinking
with' the reformulation proposal as the starting point for that
much-needed critical engagement.
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